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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1244 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
FRANCISCO LOPEZ 
aka Luis Armando Garcia 
 
     Francisco Lopez, 
                        Appellant  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-11-cr-00684-003 
District Judge: The Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 19, 2018 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 24, 2018)             
                  
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION* 
_____________________        
                       
 
 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SMITH, Chief Judge. 
I.  
Francisco Lopez was convicted of marijuana distribution and money laundering 
offenses. On appeal, he argues that: (1) his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was 
violated when a government agent presented testimonial statements from an out-of-court 
declarant; (2) hearsay was admitted in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(E); and (3) the District Court erroneously applied an “organizer/leadership 
role” enhancement at sentencing. We conclude that neither the Confrontation Clause nor 
Rule 801 was violated, and that the District Court did not commit plain error in imposing 
the sentencing enhancement. 
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Because we write for 
the parties only, we need not recite the facts or procedural history of this case. 
III.  
 Lopez argues that, at trial, the Government introduced statements from a 
cooperating co-defendant, Jorge Murillo, through the in-court testimony of Special Agent 
William Crogan.  Lopez posits that Murillo’s statements were “testimonial” under 
contemporary Confrontation Clause doctrine, and that because Murillo himself did not 
testify, Lopez had no opportunity to confront Murillo’s statements. We exercise plenary 
review over Confrontation Clause challenges.  United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 
125 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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Lopez fails to identify which of Murillo’s statements, exactly, were introduced at 
trial. However, Lopez does argue that “allowing Murillo’s statements made to Special 
Agent Crogan, that Lopez was a high level distributor who coordinated deliveries of 
tractor trailer truckloads of marijuana from Mexico . . . violated [Lopez’s] Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.”  Lopez Br. 17. As an example 
of testimony that violated his Confrontation Clause right, Lopez cites the testimony of 
Special Agent Crogan, in which he testified to the “significance” of a label on a bale of 
marijuana. Id. at 20 (citing JA 187–88). 
Special Agent Crogan noted that the label could be used to track the bale, “just 
like a [sic] UPS package,” and that he “kn[e]w in—in going through this investigation 
that most marijuana—this marijuana came from Mexico and a lot of marijuana that 
comes from Mexico is smuggled in bulk form on tractor trailer commercial trucks.” JA 
187–88. This testimony was relevant because Lopez was alleged to have smuggled 
marijuana on tractor trailers that originated from Mexico. Notably missing from Special 
Agent Crogan’s testimony is any mention of statements made by Murillo. Special Agent 
Crogan did not, for example, testify that Murillo told him about the label on the 
marijuana. Rather, Special Agent Crogan mentions twice that his knowledge of the label 
stemmed from his “training and experience.”1  
                                                 
1 JA 188 (“I know based on my training and experience that this tracks the type of 
marijuana this is and perhaps the owner that delivered it and—and also the 
customer who’s—who’s ultimately going to take control of it.”); id. (“[I]n my 
training and experience, I’ve been involved in investigations that marijuana can be 
transported a bunch of different ways, it depends on where it comes from. I know 
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Lopez essentially argues that Special Agent Crogan lied. Specifically, Lopez 
argues that Special Agent Crogan did not connect the marijuana to Mexico and tractor 
trailers because of his training, but rather because he knew of Murillo’s statements to 
Government investigators indicating such a connection. But at trial Lopez had the 
opportunity to confront Special Agent Crogan and test his veracity before the finder of 
fact by asking Crogan to explain the basis for his statements. Had Special Agent Crogan 
said, for example, that “Murillo told me this marijuana was from Mexico,” then our 
analysis would be different, since the Government would have been introducing 
testimonial statements by Murillo without providing Lopez the opportunity to confront 
those testimonial statements.2 No such statements by Murillo were admitted. In light of 
Lopez’s opportunity to confront Special Agent Crogan at trial, we hold that the 
Confrontation Clause was not violated. 
                                                                                                                                                             
in—in going through this investigation that most marijuana—this marijuana came 
from Mexico and a lot of marijuana that comes from Mexico is smuggled in bulk 
form on tractor trailer commercial trucks and you can fit a lot of contraband or 
drugs on—on a tractor trailer. This is what—this is all what this—this label means 
to me.”). 
2 Murillo’s statements were made to government investigators during interrogation 
and pre-trial proceedings. They therefore qualify as “testimonial” statements under 
contemporary Confrontation Clause doctrine, Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 
(2015), and would have required confrontation had the Government sought to 
introduce them at trial.  See Berrios, 676 F.3d, at 127 (“[O]ur Confrontation Clause 
inquiry is twofold. First, a court should determine whether the contested statement 
by an out-of-court declarant qualifies as testimonial under Davis[ v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813 (2006)] and its progeny. Second, the court should apply the 
appropriate safeguard. If the absent witness’s statement is testimonial, then the 
Confrontation Clause requires “unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.” Crawford [v. Washington], 541 U.S. [36,] 68 [(2004)]. If the 
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IV.  
 Lopez next argues that statements made to Karla Leon by non-testifying co-
defendants Jorge Murillo and Cesar Vega-Castro should have been excluded from 
evidence because those statements were hearsay statements that were not made in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. The admissibility of such evidence is governed by Federal 
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), which provides: 
Rule 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; 
Exclusions From Hearsay 
. . .  
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that 
meets the following conditions is not hearsay: 
. . .  
(2) An Opposing Party’s Statement. The statement is 
offered against an opposing party and:  
. . .  
(E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and 
in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The statement must be considered but does not by itself 
establish the . . . existence of the conspiracy or participation 
in it under (E). 
Fed R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). This Court has previously made clear that a coconspirator 
statement may be admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) if it meets three conditions: “(1) 
there must be independent evidence establishing the existence of the conspiracy and 
connecting the declarant and defendant to it; (2) the statement must have been made in 
furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) it must have been made during the course of the 
conspiracy.” United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 245 (3d Cir. 1983). Lopez takes 
issue with the Government’s ability to satisfy the second prong of this three-pronged test, 
                                                                                                                                                             
statement is nontestimonial, then admissibility is governed solely by the rules of 
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arguing that “the statements regarding [his] alleged role in the offense or the alleged 
source and size of the marijuana deliveries were not statements made ‘in furtherance of’ 
any conspiracy.” Lopez Br. 30.  
 The heart of Lopez’s argument is that, while two conspiracies were at play at trial 
(i.e., the drug distribution conspiracy and the money laundering conspiracy) Karla Leon 
was only charged with participation in the latter conspiracy, but nonetheless testified to 
the first. Lopez argues, for example, that “Leon testified that Murillo identified Lopez as 
‘the boss’ of the drug conspiracy,” as well as “that Murillo told her the drugs came from 
Mexico in tractor trailers,” and that “she was told by Vega-Castro that people in Mexico 
were very upset that Murillo was talking to law enforcement after his arrest.” Lopez Br. 
28. 
 Lopez’s argument proves unpersuasive. To start, “[t]he law is well settled that out-
of-court statements may be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) even if the defendant is 
not formally charged with any conspiracy in the indictment.”  United States v. Ellis, 156 
F.3d 493, 497 (3d Cir. 1998). Further, “[s]tatements are admissible under [Rule 
801(d)(2)(E)] even if the basis for admission is a conspiracy different from the one 
charged.” United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Our Rule 801 analysis is therefore unaffected by the Government’s 
decision to refrain from formally charging Leon with participating in both of the relevant 
conspiracies.  
                                                                                                                                                             
evidence.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Although the Government did not charge Leon regarding the drug distribution 
conspiracy, the Government argues that she played “an integral role” in that conspiracy 
by “moving a huge amount of proceeds obtained by” that conspiracy.  Gov’t Br. 27. It 
follows, according to the Government, that Leon “certainly participated in the drug 
conspiracy.”  Id. We agree with the Government.3 As an un-charged member of the drug 
distribution conspiracy, the would-be hearsay included in Leon’s statements qualified 
under the coconspirator exception of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The statements were therefore 
not hearsay, and were properly admitted into evidence. The fact that Leon was not 
charged for participating in both conspiracies does not mean that she was not a member 
of both conspiracies. It just means that, in light of Leon’s value as a cooperating witness, 
the Government chose not to charge her for all of the crimes that she was alleged to have 
committed. JA 323–27 (referring to plea agreement). 
Although Lopez argues that Leon’s statements were not “in furtherance” of the 
conspiracy, this Court has made clear that “[s]tatements between conspirators which . . . 
inform each other of the current status of the conspiracy further the ends of the 
conspiracy.” Amar, 714 F.2d, at 252. Knowing who “the boss” of the conspiracy was, 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., JA 335–37 (Q. So, what did he, what did Mr. Murillo tell you that he 
and Cesar were doing? A. They were the ones making deposits at the banks here 
and in New York. . . . Q. And did there come a time when he told you what the 
money was from? A. Yes. Q. And when was that approximately? A. That was 
when he came—he went to Tucson and we met in person . . . . [H]e kind of told me 
everything and he said that they were doing drugs or they were selling drugs or 
getting loads of drugs here . . . Q. So, I’m going to back you up a little bit back to 
when he was asking to use your account. So, did you agree to let your account be 
used? A. I did.”).  
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where the drugs came from, and that those near the source of the drugs were “very upset” 
about law enforcement snooping around into the conspiracy are all statements made in 
furtherance of the drug distribution conspiracy.  
But whether or not Leon was a member of the drug distribution conspiracy, her 
statements were also in furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy with which she 
was formally charged. As the Government argues, “a person engaged in [the type of] 
extensive money laundering asked of [Leon] certainly needed to know where the money 
was coming from, and who the other participants and leaders were.” Gov’t Br. 27. We 
agree. Having this information allowed Leon to “kn[o]w who to trust and also 
underst[and] the vital need for secrecy in the endeavor.” Id. We hold that the statements 
referred to by Leon were therefore made in furtherance of both conspiracies, and were 
properly admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).4 
                                                 
4 Importantly, Lopez only objected to one co-conspirator statement made by Leon. 
The factual determinations underlying whether that statement that is statement of a 
coconspirator under Rule 801 is therefore reviewed under the clear error standard 
of review. United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2002). By 
comparison, unpreserved objections are reviewed for plain error.  United States v. 
Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 174 n.6 (3d Cir. 2002). Lopez argues that he only objected 
once because after his first objection the District Court told him that it would be 
“pointless.”  Lopez Br. 27. This explanation does not excuse trial counsel from 
failing to make objections when appropriate and in the best interest of their client. 
Moreover, when considered in its proper context, the District Court’s actual 
statement appears far less ominous than Lopez would have us believe.  JA 282 
(“Indeed, all of these writings are statements in furtherance—furtherance of a 
conspiracy, which is why I assume [defense counsel] didn’t object, because it 
would have been a pointless objection.”). We conclude that under either standard 
of review, the statements were properly admitted.  
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V.  
Finally, Lopez also contends that the District Court “erroneously applied an 
‘organizer/leadership role’ enhancement” under § 3B1.1(a) of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Lopez Br. 32. We disagree. 
 In his opening brief, Lopez argues that we should review this argument de novo. 
The Government responds that plain error review applies. In reply, Lopez acknowledges 
that “counsel did not cite the application note in his objections to the Presentence 
Report.” Lopez Reply Br. 3. Nevertheless, Lopez insists that de novo review applies 
because he made “the identical factual arguments” in the District Court. Id. Lopez’s 
attempt to salvage a more favorable standard of review is unpersuasive. In the District 
Court he challenged the application of the leadership enhancement of § 3B1.1(a) by 
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support it. Because this is an entirely 
different argument than the one he raises on appeal, plain error review applies. 
 In support of his claim that § 3B1.1(a) does not apply to him, Lopez relies heavily 
on United States v. Salgado, 745 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2014), where the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed the district court’s application of § 3B1.1 to a defendant who had been convicted 
on both drug conspiracy and money laundering conspiracy charges. Id. at 1136. The 
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the district court ran afoul of Application Note 2(c) to § 
2S1.15 of the Sentencing Guidelines because the district court based the enhancement on 
conduct related to the “heroin deal” at the heart of the conspiracy. Id. at 1137-38, 1140.  
                                                 
5 That application notes provides: “Notwithstanding § 1B1.5(c), in cases in which 
subsection (a)(1) applies, application of any Chapter Three adjustment shall be 
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But unlike in Salgado, where the enhancement was based solely on the 
defendant’s role in the drug conspiracy, id. at 1137, Lopez acknowledges that the District 
Court applied the enhancement for his leadership role in “both” the drug and money 
laundering conspiracies. Lopez Br. 34–35. His conduct with respect to the money 
laundering conspiracy was sufficient on its own to support the application of the 
leadership enhancement of § 3B1.1. See, e.g., JA 568 (deposits intended to avoid 
detection were made “at defendant’s direction”); JA 571 (money-laundering operation 
“was directed by the defendant [and] employed sophisticated means to avoid detection”).  
 Even assuming, arguendo, that the District Court committed error by referencing 
both conspiracies instead of the money laundering conspiracy alone, we conclude that 
any such error was not “plain.” Lopez has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that 
the result would have been different had he properly raised this objection before the 
District Court. See United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010). If he had, the 
District Court would have likely clarified that Lopez’s leadership of the money-
laundering conspiracy justified the § 3B1.1 enhancement. Further, these circumstances do 
not rise to the level of a “miscarriage of justice.” See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 
15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)).6 
                                                                                                                                                             
determined based on the offense covered by this guideline (i.e., the laundering of 
criminally derived funds) and not on the underlying offense from which the 
laundered funds were derived.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, Comment., App. Note 2(C). 
6 In a letter written pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), Lopez 
argues that the Supreme Court’s recent Rosales-Mireles v. United States opinion 
requires recalculation of his sentence. Although Rosales-Mireles provides guidance 
as to when a court of appeals should exercise its discretion to correct sentencing 
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VI.  
 We hold that neither the Confrontation Clause nor Federal Rule of Evidence 801 
was violated. We further hold that the District Court did not commit plain error in 
calculating Lopez’s guideline range. The District Court’s judgment will therefore be 
affirmed. 
                                                                                                                                                             
errors, Rosales-Mireles is inapplicable because the three preconditions “that must 
be met before a court may consider exercising its discretion to correct the error” 
have not been met in this appeal. Rosales-Mireles v. United States, No. 16-9493, 
2018 WL 3013806, at *5 (U.S. June 18, 2018). Namely, Lopez has failed to 
establish that the alleged sentencing error was plain. Id. (“[T]he error must be 
plain—that is to say, clear or obvious.”) (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016)). 
 
